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One of the enduring themes of the globalization debate is whether international law 
should be strengthened to protect foreign firm from discriminatory host governments, 
or rather strengthened to protect host governments from powerful multinational firms.  
This paper uses firm-level data from the World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) to lend some empirical evidence to the debate. In doing so it contributes to 
academic understanding of what a `foreign firm' is, and challenges the notion that 
institutional superiority makes OECD governments less prone to anti-foreign bias. 
Although the terms `foreign firm' and `multinational subsidiary' are often used 
interchangeably, in the WBES data the managers of only about half of the firms with 
more than ten percent foreign ownership view themselves as part of a multinational. 
This distinction between multinational and non-multinational foreign firms was 
important in regression analysis of self-reported influence over government. In non-
OECD countries - where we find no evidence of anti-foreign bias - multinationals 
appear significantly more influential than other firms. Meanwhile, in OECD countries, 
foreign non-multinationals do appear at a disadvantage in terms of influence relative 




JEL Codes: F02, F23, F52, P16 




\The ultimate subject and sovereign ruler of the world is the transnational
corporation, operating by collective prescription and enforcement through the
World Trade Organization in concert with its prototype the NAFTA, its Eu-
ropean collaborator, the EU, and such derivative regional instruments as the
APEC, the MAI, the FTAA, and so on.
Together these constitute the hierarchical formation of the planet's new rule
by extra-parliamentary and transnational at."
(John McMurtry 2002, p.202)
As with many aspects of globalization, the debate over the relationship between for-
eign rms and host governments seems to suggest that the two sides are living in parallel
worlds with diering objective realities. On the one hand critics of globalization believe
multinational corporations are extremely politically powerful and are `writing the rules' of
globalization to suit their own balance sheets at the expense of the rest of society. On the
other side are those who believe foreign rms are discriminated against and suer substantial
political risk. This paper uses a large dataset of managers' own perceptions to contribute
some empirical evidence on whether foreign-owned and/or multinational rms are more or
less inuential over governments than domestic rms. In doing so, we will also question the
extent to which substantive foreign ownership can be viewed as synonymous with multina-
tional operations.
The debate over whether foreign rms are powerful or persecuted has numerous policy
implications. Perhaps the most obvious of these policy linkages is the design of and partici-
pation in international investment agreements. Modern international investment agreements
provide a raft of protections from host government actions for foreign investors which are
supported by international law. These protections are predicated on the idea that foreign
investors are at particular risk of government predation. Ratner (2008, p.475) provides us
with a typical quote:
\[N]ational governments emphasize political participation of domestic actors,
while foreign actors must rely on international law standards for protection."
On the other side, some participants in this debate believe that the rapid spread of interna-
tional investment agreements is actually evidence of the increasing power of multinational
2corporations relative to nation states since the late nineteen eighties (Sornarajah 2006, Mann
2006).
Despite the robust policy debate, very few papers appear to have attempted to compare
the political vulnerability of domestic and foreign rms.1 This is not to say that there is a
paucity literature on the interactions between foreign rms and host governments. Rather,
the existing literature somewhat mirrors the public debate in either focusing only on the
special problems foreign rms encounter in their relationship with governments, or only on
the problems hosts have in governing for social good while competing for `footloose capital'2.
There are two main streams within the management literature which have focused on the
challenges faced by foreign rms in their relationship with host governments. The rst is the
host-multinational bargaining literature which originated in the 1980s with seminal contri-
butions such as Vernon's (1980) paper on the obsolescing bargain between foreign investors
and host governments.3 This literature was motivated by the wave of nationalizations by
developing countries during the nineteen seventies of foreign rms in the resource sector,
and it essentially maintains the assumption that the welfare of foreign rms is of no interest
to host governments (except where the interests of host and investor are aligned). This
assumption follows from the observation that foreign investors do not have voting rights
and that the prots of foreign investments are repatriated to the source country. A central
intuition of this literature is that the threat of exit and the possession of rent-generating
knowledge-capital are important sources of bargaining power for foreign rms and that this
power lessens over time as costs are sunk and knowledge transferred to the host economy.
Similar assumptions about the relationship between foreign investors and host governments
are made in the economics literature on the theory of international investment agreements
(Markusen 2001, Aisbett et al. 2010).
The second strand of the management literature of relevance to our paper was developed
by authors such as Zaheer (1995) and examines the liabilities of foreignness. In contrast to
1We are only aware of Hansen and Mitchell (2000) and Luo and Mezias (2002).
2Government eorts to attract a larger share of globally mobile capital have been hypothesized to lead
to negative policy outcomes such as `race to the bottom', `regulatory chill', and `pollution havens'.
3More recent contributions to this literature have broadened the view of government-rm bargaining
to other sectors such as manufacturing (Kobrin 1987) and broadened and adapted the theory toward a
political bargaining model to reect the signicantly less adversarial nature of government-rm relations
in recent decades (Eden et al. 2005). The empirical contributions to this literature test the importance of
various sources of rm or host bargaining power for bargaining outcomes such as ownership shares of foreign
rm-host government joint ventures. See for example Fagre and Jr. (1982), Lecraw (1984), Kobrin (1987),
Gomes-Casseres (1990) and Lee (2004). Yet, being an international management literature, none of these
contributions are concerned with comparing the bargaining strength of multinationals to that of local rms.
3the multinational-government bargaining literature discussed above, this literature focuses
on investments into developed countries. This literature also diers from the former in that
the sources of the liability of foreignness are not outright disenfranchisement, but rather
cultural and institutional dierences between the rm's home and host countries. One of the
contributions of our paper is to study the government-rm relationship across a broad cross-
section of countries, rather than focusing only on developing countries (as in the bargaining
literature) or developed countries (as in the `liability of foreignness literature'). We also
check whether there are systematic dierences in the determinants of inuence in OECD
versus non-OECD countries.
One of the more important contributions of the current paper is to head Zaheer's (2002)
call that the literature pay more attention to what is meant by `foreign' versus `local' rms
and examine separately the implications of a rm's foreignness and its status as a multi-
national. Zaheer particularly noted that foreign multinationals may be competing against
both purely domestic rms and local rms who are themselves multinationals. Our paper
addresses Zaheer's concern and goes beyond it to also consider the converse case - that not
all `foreign rms' consider themselves part of a multinational.
Zaheer's (2002) point that foreign multinationals may be competing against locally-based
multinationals is uncontroversial. However, the idea that rms with substantial foreign own-
ership may actually not consider themselves part of a multinational requires some elabora-
tion. The standard denition of a multinational enterprise is a rm which engages in foreign
direct investment (FDI), where FDI is dened as \investments in which the rm acquires a
substantial controlling interest in a foreign rm or sets up a subsidiary in a foreign coun-
try" (Markusen 2004, p.5). Following this denition, the standard method in the empirical
literature in either economics or management is to dene any rm with more than a certain
percentage (ranging from ten to fty percent) foreign ownership as a `foreign-owned rm', a
label which is used inter-changeably with `multinational subsidiary' or simply `foreign rm'.4
Any rm which has positive but smaller levels of foreign ownership is considered to be the
recipient of portfolio investment. It is generally thought that FDI is associated with the
transfer of specic resources and capabilities such as management style or technology to the
recipient rm or subsidiary, while portfolio investment is not (Markusen 2004). We examine
the extent to which a percentage-based denition of FDI aligns with managers' beliefs about
whether their rm is part of a multinational enterprise.
The analysis in this paper uses the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) con-
4See for example Albornoz et al. (2009), Heyman et al. (2007) and Dasgupta et al. (2000).
4ducted by the World Bank across 80 countries in 1999-2000. The WBES was designed
specically to examine the government-rm relationship in a wide range of countries and
has been used by a number of previous papers to test theories relating to rm inuence over
government (Campos and Giovannoni 2007, Chong and Gradstein 2007, Desai and Olofsgard
2008). Questions of `foreignness' were not central to any of the previous papers and although
a foreign ownership dummy was included in their regressions, the econometric approach was
not ideal for the purposes of this paper.5 In particular, all of the previous studies appear
to have used a dummy indicating any foreign ownership to dene foreign rms, and none of
them made use of the question in the WBES which allowed rms to identify themselves as
part of a multinational. Independently identifying foreign ownership and multinationality
is important since the two characteristics have potentially opposite implications for a rms
ability to inuence government.
Our analysis in Section 2 suggests that substantive foreign ownership does not correlated
with a rm's identication as part of a multinational as well as is typically assumed. Further-
more, the results in Section 4 indicate that foreign-ownership and multinational operations
have very dierent implications for the relationship with the host government. Managers of
rms which are part of a multinational report signicantly higher inuence over governments
than those who do not, while foreign ownership is generally not correlated with inuence.
The checks discussed in Sections 3 and 5 indicate that the magnitudes of the estimated coef-
cients are remarkably robust across a range of specications and within subsamples of the
data, including the large-rm subsample. The only subsample for which our central ndings
did not appear to hold was OECD, where multinationals do not appear more inuential,
and foreign non-multinational rms are signicantly less inuential than their local counter-
parts. Section 6 concludes with some implications for the policy debate and considerations
for future research.
2. Data
The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) is a survey of over 10,000 rms in 80
countries and one territory conducted in 1999-2000. The survey was conducted thought
face-to-face interviews with rm managers and owners and covers a large range of questions
5For example Chong and Gradstein (2007) and Campos and Giovannoni (2007) were interested in country
characteristics such as national income and therefore did not include country dummies in their specication,
while Desai and Olofsgard (2008) using a matching approach and do not report the coecient on foreign
ownership.
5concerning the rm's relationship with the government, including perceptions of regulations,
corruption, inuence, macroeconomic policies, competition, and infrastructure.6 We use
data from all countries except those in Africa and the Middle East as these regions do not
have data on rm beliefs about inuence on government. The countries for which there was
at least one rm with all the data required for our base specication are listed in the Table
13 in the Appendix.
2.1 Foreign-ownership, Multi-nationality, and the denition of `For-
eign Firms'
The distinction between foreign rms and multinational rms is important to our analysis.
In the public discourse critics of globalization tend to refer to `multinationals' (usually in the
pejorative) while proponents of globalization prefer to talk about `foreign rms'. The two
terms are often used interchangeably by economics and management scholars, who dene
foreign rms as those having at least 10% or 50% foreign ownership respectively. The WBES
dataset is richer than most used in the literature because, in addition to foreign ownership7,
it also contains information on whether the rm beleives itself to be part of a multinational8.
In regard to relationship with government, the extent to which a rm sees itself - and the
government sees it - as part of a multinational may matter more than the share of foreign
capital in the company. The extent to which these two measures align, and which of the
two matter more for the relationship with government are empirical questions addressed by
this paper. The former question is the subject of Tables 1-3 which provide cross-tabulations
of rm's multi-nationality and their foreign ownership using a 1%, 10% and 50% foreign
dention respectively.
Firms in the top right of Tables 1-3 have multi-national operations but are not classied
as foreign-owned. We consider these rms to be multi-nationals operating in their home
country (parent companies). Depending on the foreign-ownership criterion chosen, roughly
half to two-thirds of the rms in our sample which identify as multinationals are operating
in their home country.9 These rms do not tell us anything about the validity of classifying
6Permanent url http://go.worldbank.org/RV060VBJU0
7The exact wording in the survey was \Does any foreign company or individual have a nancial stake in
the ownership of your rm?", for those rms which answered yes, the survey asked what the total percent
of foreign holdings was.
8The exact wording of the question was \Does your rm have holdings or operations in other countries?"
9In Table 1 when rms are considered foreign if they have any foreign ownership, 597 of the 1,256
multinationals are classied as multinationals at home, while in Table 3 when the foreign-rm criterion is
6foreign multinationals on the basis of ownership share, but their numbers large enough that
we can be condent of identifying the co-ecient on multinationality independently of that
for foreign ownership in our later regression analysis.
The rms in the bottom right of Tables 1-3 identify themselves as multinationals and
are classied as foreign-owned. We consider these rms to be foreign multinationals (sub-
sidiaries). As recipients of direct investment by multinationals we might expect these rms
to gain brands, knowledge, technology, management style and bargaining power along with
funds from the parent. In Tables 2 and 3 these rms are the ones for which rms' own
identication of their multi-nationality aligns with the proxies used in empirical work in the
economics and management literatures.
Firms in the bottom left of Tables 1-3 are classied as foreign-owned but do not identify
themselves as part of a multinational. We consider these rms to be the recipient of foreign
portfolio investment where - in contrast to the recipients of direct investment - the foreign
involvement is restricted to the provision of funds. In Tables 2 and 3 these rms are the ones
for which rms' own identication of their multi-nationality does not align with the proxies
used in empirical work in the economics and management literatures respectively.
The question of whether the proxies used in the literature to identify foreign direct invest-
ment by multinationals align well with rm's self classications is answered by comparing
the bottom left and right columns in Tables 2 and 3. The answer is that the classications
used by either the economics of management literatures identify roughly twice as many rms
as foreign multinational subsidiaries as do rms' own classications.10 While the 50% foreign
ownership dention has less type I error (excessive identication of foreign multinationals)
than the 10% or 1% classications in the upper two tables, we should be cautious of claiming
its superiority as a proxy given that it is likely to be associated with an increase in type II
error (falsely classifying foriegn multinational subsidiries as home multinational parents).
For the purposes of this paper the denition of a foreign rm used in the economics
literature - that is the 10% ownership criterion - appears to oer the best trade-o between
type I and type II errors of classication of rms as foreign. Based on this detion of foreign
we construct four mutually exclusive types of rm: purely local rms (the reference group in
our regressions), multinationals operating in their home country (MN at Home), subsidiaries
raised to a 50% ownership share, the number classied as home multinationals rises to 813.
10In Table 2 605 of the 1,183 rms which would be classied as recipients of foreign direct investment
by the economics literature do not report their rm having operations or holdings in other countries, these
gures improve only slightly to 372 out of 815 using the management literature's classication as in Table 3.
7of foreign multinationals (Foreign MN), and foreign-owned rms that do not identify as part
of a multinational (Foreign nonMN).11 We summarize the characteristics of these four types
of rm under the next heading.
Foreign Ownership > 0% Multi-national
0 1 Total
0 6,046 597 6,643
1 709 659 1,368
Total 6,755 1,256 8,011
Table 1: Cross-tab of multinational operations and some foreign ownership indicates that
co-linearity of these measures is not a concern in our regression analysis.
Foreign Ownership  10% Multi-national
0 1 Total
0 6,150 678 6,828
1 605 578 1,183
Total 6,755 1,256 8,011
Table 2: Cross-tab of multinational operations and at least 10% foreign ownership shows low
correlation between the two and highlights the limitations of the practice in the economics
literature of using the latter to identify direct investment by multinational rms.
Foreign Ownership  50% Multi-national
0 1 Total
0 6,383 813 7,196
1 372 443 815
Total 6,755 1,256 8,011
Table 3: Cross-tab of multinational operations and at least 50% foreign ownership shows low
correlation between the two and highlights the limitations of the practice in the management
literature of using the latter to identify direct investment by multinational rms.
2.2 Firm Characteristics by `Foreignness' Classication
The WBES data contains a number other rm characteristics which we might expect to
be associated with a rm's ability to inuence government decisions of relevance to its
11\MN at Home" is coded 1 for all rms who answered `yes' to the question of whether their rm had
holdings or operations in other countries, and less than 10% foreign ownership. \Foreign MN" is coded 1 for
all rms who answered `yes' holdings or operations in other countries, and at least 10% foreign ownership.
\Foreign nonMN" is coded 1 for all rms who answered `no' to the other country question but report at
least 10% foreign ownership. Thus these three categories are mutually exclusive.
8operations. The variables utilized in our primary analysis are:12
 Export status: coded 1 if rms export some product and 0 otherwise,
 Government ownership: coded 1 if rms reported having any share of government
ownership, 0 otherwise,
 Size: coded 1 for small (5   50 employees), 2 for medium (51   500 employees) and 3
for large (> 500 employees),
 Age: coded 1 for 0 5 years, 2 for 6 20 years, and 3 for more than 20 years rm age,
 Capital intensity as measured by ratio of reported value of sales to xed assets13,
 Number of competitors category14,
 Sector: manufacturing, services, other, agriculture, and construction, and
 Country of operation of respondent rm.
Table 4 shows the distribution of rms across the categorical control variables. The
right-most column of Table 4 summarizes the sample as a whole, while the other columns
provide the information for the subsamples: purely domestic, multinational at home, foreign
multinational, and foreign non-multinational; where foreign ownership is dened using the
economics literature's 10% ownership rule. Overall, Table 4 provides further evidence that
the subsidiaries of foreign multinationals are, indeed, quite dierent to other foreign rms.
In regard to propensity to export, size, and age, foreign multinational rms are more similar
to local multinationals than to foriegn, non-multinational rms. Close to two-thirds of both
foreign and local multinationals export. Export propensity drops to just over half for foreign
non-multinationals and only a quarter for purely domestic rms. Foreign multinationals
are the largest rms, followed in decreasing size by domestic mulitnationals, foreign non-
multinationals, and purely local rms. Multinational rms tend to be older than non-
multinationals, and foreign ownership appears to have no eect on the age distribution for the
12We also make use of a number of other variables from the WBES in our robustness checks. Variables
used in the robustness checks are discussed in Section 3.3.
13In some countries the data for these variables was only collected in categories. Since the WBES surveys
varied only by region, we correct for this in our regression analysis by interacting the capital intensity measure
with region dummies.
14The categorization of number of competitors varied region, thus our regressions interact the competition
measure with region dummies.
9latter group. Foreign multinationals are also more similar to their local counter-parts than
to foreign non-multinationals in their propensity to operate in the service sector, however,
foreign ownership does seem to be associated with a higher likelihood of manufacturing for
both multinationals and non-multinationals.
Arguably the most interesting summary statistics in Table 4 are those for the fraction
of rms with government ownership. Foreign multinationals stand-out from the three other
types of rm in being substantially less likely to have some government ownership. Our
implicit assumption is that all of the variables in Table 4 cause dierences in rm bargain-
ing power and inuence over government decisions of importance to the rm's operations.
However, in the case of government ownership, there is also a long lineage of papers arguing
the reverse causality, namely that joint ventures of foreign multinationals which have more
bargaining power will have lower levels of foreign ownership than those in which the for-
eign rm has less intrinsic bargaining power.15 Thus, the relatively low fraction of foreign
multinationals with government ownership may actually be an indicator of their strength in
bargaining with governments compared to other types of rms.
Variable Mean
Domestic MN at Home Foreign MN Foreign nonMN All
Govt. Ownership 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.13
Exporter 0.24 0.63 0.62 0.55 0.33
Medium 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.52 0.42
Large 0.11 0.36 0.44 0.27 0.17
Middle-aged 0.34 0.29 0.28 0.36 0.33
Old 0.33 0.57 0.45 0.34 0.36
Manufacturing 0.35 0.44 0.50 0.53 0.38
Services 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.39 0.46
Table 4: Summary of Firm Characteristics for rms grouped by concepts of `foreignness'.
The highest value in each row is in bold. Foreign-owned multinational rms are seen to dier
substantively from non-multinational foreign-owned rms. Foreign ownership in this table
is dened using the minimum 10% ownership criterion common in the empirical economics
literature.
2.3 Inuence over Government
The dependent variable in our regressions is the self-reported inuence which managers
believe their rm has over various branches of the national government in the country in
15See for example Fagre and Jr. (1982), Lecraw (1984), Kobrin (1987), Nakamura and Xie (1998), and Lee
(2004).
10which they are operating. Specically, the WBES asked rms for each of the Executive,
Legislature, Ministry and Regulatory Agency:
\When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a
substantial impact on your business, how much inuence does your rm typically
have at the national level of government on the content of that law, rule, regula-
tion or decree? Would you say very inuential, frequently inuential, inuential,
seldom inuential or never inuential?"
Table 5 shows that the average level of inuence rms feel they have over all four branches
of government is roughly equal at around 1:6   1:7, suggesting that the average rm feels it
is somewhere between \never" and \seldom" inuential.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Inuence Executive 1.659 1.016 1 5 6095
Inuence Regulator 1.701 1.034 1 5 5971
Inuence Legislature 1.617 0.987 1 5 6104
Inuence Ministry 1.656 1.012 1 5 6094
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Inuence Measures.
A high degree of co-linearity between the four measures of inuence in Table 516 suggests
that treating them as four separate dependent variables would amount to duplication and
limit the space available for other analysis and robustness checks. However, the ordinal
nature of the variables means that creating a composite variable by averaging or adding
them is not appropriate. Additionally, we have no means by which to judge which of the four
measures of inuence is the most important for any given rm, since the most important
branch of government over which to exert inuence is likely to vary by rm and country
of operation. Thus the analysis in this paper is based on a variable constructed from the
maximum reported inuence over any branch of government for each rm (henceforth referred
to as the `maximum-inuence variable').17 In Section 3.3 we additionally run our base
regression using the original four inuence variables in order to conrm that our choice of
composite variable has not had a substantial impact on our results.
Figure 1 compares rm responses for our dependent variable across foreignness groups.
It shows the mean and standard error of the mean maximum-inuence by `foreignness' clas-
sication. The unconditional means displayed in the gure suggest that neither type of
16Pair-wise correlations for the four inuence variables range from 0:77   0:83.
17For example, if a rm reports inuence scores of 1 1 2 and 3 for the Executive, Regulator, Legislature
and Ministry respectively, then the maximum-inuence variable takes a value of 3 for that rm.
11foreign rm (multinational or non-multinational) suer from a lack of inuence over host
governments relative to purely domestic rms - indeed both are signicantly more inuential
on average. Furthermore, foreign multinationals do not appear any more or less inuential
than their local counter-parts, while both groups of multinationals are signicantly more
inuential than foreign non-multinationals. We will see below that this pattern is robust to
conditioning the mean on a variety of relevant controls.
Figure 1: Comparison of reported inuence across rms grouped by `foreignness'. Displays
the mean and standard error of mean for each foreignness classication of the maximum-
inuence variable. Multinational rms can be seen to report signicantly higher inuence.
3. Empirical Approach and Hypotheses
Our ambition in this paper is not to test causal relationships, rather, we suggest that there is
much insight to be gained through careful regression analysis which allows us to examine the
correlation between foreign ownership and/or multinational status and perceived inuence
over government, controlling for other observable characteristics (e.g. size) which may be
correlated with `foreignness'. Our empirical emphasis notwithstanding, it seems appropriate
to outline the theoretical intuition which has motivated our choice of control variables and
which underlies our discussion of the results.
123.1 Hypotheses and Intuition
The multinational-host bargaining literature discussed in the Introduction is the primary
theoretical basis for our hypotheses - although we note that many of our predictions could
be based on alternative theories. The basic intuition which we take from the bargaining
literature is that the inuence a rm has over the government is increasing in the benets
which the operation of the rm produces both directly for the government and for the
national economy more broadly, and also increasing in the credibility of the rm's threat to
relocate its operations elsewhere.
We apply this logic rst to the rm characteristic of multinational operation and predict
that multinationals will be more inuential for two reasons. Firstly, multi-nationality is the
best example of a characteristic will which generate higher inuence due to a more credible
relocation threat. Secondly, the leading theories of multinational rms suggest that they
have special characteristics which allow them to generate excess prots compared to their
competitors and which will not be transferred to an economy without the operation of that
rm in the economy (Markusen 2004, Helpman 2006). Thus multinationals are also likely to
be more inuential because they have more benets to oer governments and economies.
In contrast to our clear predictions for multi-nationality, the average relationship between
foreign-ownership and inuence not easy to predict. On the one hand most governments
around the world are keen to attract for investment in order to cover shortfalls in domestic
savings and investment. Foreign ownership may also be associated with higher relocation or
shut-down threat. On the other hand, xenophobia on behalf of a voting public and lack of
voting rights on behalf of foreign owners mean that foreign ownership is likely to be associated
with lower political benets for the government. Repatriation of prots to the home nation
and tax treaties may also lower the economic benets the government expects from foreign-
owned rms. Given this complexity, it is also possible that the impact of foreign-ownership
on inuence is dierent for rms with and without multinational operations. We allow for
this in our regression specication.
Moving on to our control variables, rm size and export status are characteristics which
we expect to nd associated with inuence because they generate more benets for the
economy as a whole, and particularly in areas on which governments tend to place emphasis
such as employment and generation of foreign earnings. Government ownership is another
characteristic which we expect to be associated with inuence due to the direct alignment of
rm and government interests. The relationship between rm age and inuence is slightly
13more dicult to predict. The multinational-host bargaining literature predicts decreasing
inuence with age for this type of rm as costs are sunk and capabilities transferred to the
local economy. However, other types of rms may be come increasingly politically embedded
with age, thus might be expected to become more inuential over time. We examine possible
interactions between age and `foreignness' in one of our specications.
The inuence of sunk costs on bargaining power motivates our inclusion of sales to capital
ratio in our regressions. We would expect more capital intensive rms to have less inuence.
We also expect rms with more competitors to be less inuential as competition erodes
rents, some of which can be transferred to government in return for inuence. We include
both these controls in our regressions but do not test hypotheses about either due to data
limitations discussed in Section 2.2.
The sector in which a rm operates is another variable which we include in our regression
but whose relationship with inuence we do not predict. Sector dummies are included in
the specication because sectors dier in regard to their impacts on government objectives.
For example agriculture is most closely related to rural growth and poverty reduction, while
services such as utilities, telecommunications and nancial services have also have important
welfare implications. Sectors also dier in regard to the extent to which domestic production
is substitutable with foreign imports and thus the credibility of the threat of shut-down or
relocation due to less favorable conditions compared to alternative production locations. For
example, we expect manufacturing to be more easily substitutable for foreign production
than the other sectors.
Our nal control variables are country dummies. There are many possible reasons for
including country eects in our regressions, but in regard to our basic bargaining intuition
we can understand the country-dummies as capturing the dierences between states in the
benets they expect from rm operations and expansion (including growth, poverty reduc-
tion, and productivity gains) compared to the costs they expect to incur due, for example,
to natural resource degradation or social change.
3.2 Regression Specication
Since the dependent variable is an ordered categorical variable, we use a robust ordered logit
estimation of the regression equation:18
18We have also run the regressions using a robust ordered probit estimator and found negligible change in
the estimated coecients.















Where D indicates a dummy variable, r indexes the region, k the country, and s the
sector of operation of the rm. Capital intensity and number of competitors are interacted
with region in Equation (1) due to data inconsistencies across regions. The short, medium
and long descriptions other variables in Equation (1) are given in Table 3.2:
Short: Medium: Long
in: Inuence: Maximum reported inuence over any
branch of govt.
mnch: MNC at Home: Multinational rm operating in home
country
mncf: MNC Foreign: Multinational rm outside home/MNC
subsidiary
fnmn: Foreign non-MNC: Foreign ownership but no operations in
other countries
exp: Exporter: Export some proportion of output
gvt: Govt. Ownership: Some government ownership of rm
size: Medium, Large (Small ex-
cluded):
Dummies for size categories
age: Middle-aged, Old (Young
excluded):
Dummies for age categories
skr: Sales to Capital: Value of sales to Fixed Assets
cmp: Competitors: Categorical measure of Number of
Competitors
Dr: Region: Region dummies




Dk: Country: Country dummies
Table 6: Primary regression variables' names and descriptions. Detailed descriptions and
summary statistics are in Section 2. Additional variables used in robustness checks are
discussed in Section 3.3.
Estimated regression co-ecients rather than marginal eects are reported throughout
this paper as we are more interested in the relationship between the explanatory variables
and the latent inuence variable than their impact on the probability of reporting a particular
categorical level of inuence.
15The specication in Equation (1) includes dummies which allow dierent intercepts for
rms in dierent size categories and industries. It may be the case, however, that all the
coecients in the regression equation vary according to these classications. For this reason
we also run regressions by size category and separately for services and manufacturing. A
similar concern motivates our inclusion of regression results by regional subsample.
3.3 Robustness Checks and Empirical Issues
Numerous additional variables from the WBES dataset were used to test the robustness of
the results obtained in our base specication given by Equation (1). Some of these robustness
checks addressed potential omitted variable biases due to other determinants of inuence,
while others addressed potential survey-related biases such as representativeness of sampling
and general optimism of respondents.
Three previous papers by Chong and Gradstein (2007), Campos and Giovannoni (2007)
and Desai and Olofsgard (2008) have used the same or similar data from the World Bank to
ask questions related to rm inuence over government. Between them these papers included
a number of potential determinants of inuence which are not included in our base speci-
cation. These variables included lobby group membership, the concentration of ownership
of the rm, the legal organization of the company, whether the headquarters of the rm
were located in a capital city, the rm's attitudes towards irregular \additional payments"
to government, and how predictable the rm views changes in rules, laws and regulations
to be. While an argument could be made for each of these variables as a determinant of
inuence, we have not included them in our base regression either due to endogeneity con-
cerns (e.g. rms may resort to \additional payments" if they do not have other means of
inuence) or due to missing values excessively reducing the sample size (as was the case for
lobby group membership19, legal organization of the company, location of headquarters and
concentration of ownership). Rather than include these variables in our base specication
we have run a series of robustness checks including dierent combinations of these variables.
We nd they have minor quantitative and no qualitative impact on our ndings with regard
to any of our rm-level measures of global connectedness.20
In addition to other potential determinants of rm inuence, Desai and Olofsgard (2008)
pay close attention to the problems of comparability when respondents are asked to use
19There was no variable indicating lobby group membership in the WBES data.
20Results of these regressions are available on request from the author.
16ordinal response categories. They note that
\Dierent respondents may interpret concepts such as \inuence" in vastly
dierent ways based on unobservable characteristics (\culture," socialization,
etc.). Ordinal scales may mean dierent things to dierent respondents based on
idiosyncratic factors such as mood or overall optimism."
(Desai and Olofsgard 2008, p.13)
Consequently the authors employ two methods to correct for the potential biases arising
from idiosyncratic respondent dierences in reporting inuence on an ordinal scale. Firstly
they construct their inuence variable as a deviation from the respondent's perception of
their own rm's inuence and that of other rms' inuence. This approach is not available
to us as the WBES data does not contain responses to questions about the inuence of other
rms.
The second technique Desai and Olofsgard (2008) use to address idiosyncratic respon-
dent dierences is to try to control for the overall optimism of the respondent by including
variables which they believe should aect all rms equally. Specically, they use the man-
agers' responses to questions about the degree to which they view macroeconomic instability
(specically ination) and economic policy uncertainty as constraints to their business as
proxies for the propensity of the respondent to complain. Both of these variables are avail-
able to us in the WBES data, however, it is not altogether clear ex ante that the impact of
macroeconomic instability or economic policy uncertainty should be the same for all types
of rms. In particular, it seems likely that the impact of these variables might vary system-
atically with our variables of interest, namely foreign connections. Thus we do not include
these variables in our base regression, but do include them in our robustness checks. Our
robustness checks also included two alternative proxies for the overall optimism of the re-
spondents, namely how problematic they consider street crime/theft/disorder, and organized
crime/Maa for the operation and growth of their business.
An additional source of bias which is not discussed by Desai and Olofsgard (2008) is
unobserved heterogeneity in the respondents' general attitudes toward the government in
the country of operation. These attitudes may vary for cultural or historical reasons, as
well as due to the respondent's personal experiences outside the management of their rm.
Including proxies for these attitudes in the base regression specication is not justied as
reverse causality from success in inuencing government to general attitudes may bias the
coecients. On the other hand, ignoring this source of heterogeneity may lead to omitted
17variable bias. Thus we run an additional robustness check in which we include a number of
proxies for general attitude toward government, namely the responses to the questions:
 Please evaluate the following statement: \The process of developing new rules, regu-
lations or policies is usually such that businesses are informed in advance of changes
aecting them." This is true: always, mostly, frequently, sometimes, seldom, never.
 Do you regularly have to cope with unexpected changes in economic and nancial
policies which materially aect your business? Responses were on a six-point scale
from completely predictable to completely unpredictable.
 Please rate your overall perception of the relation between government and/or bureau-
cracy and private rms on the following scale. \All in all, for doing business I perceive
the state as": very helpful, mildly helpful, neutral, mildly unhelpful, very unhelpful.
The question was asked separately for national and local governments.
Since none of our attempts to address unobserved respondent heterogeniety had any
material eect on our results we do not report them in the paper.21 Our interpretation of
the nding of no eect on our coecients of interest is that although unobserved respondent
heterogeniety is certainly present, it did not cause bias because it was not correlated with
our explanatory variables of interest.
4. `Foreignness' and Influence over Government
We begin our analysis by comparing results from our base specication with those for speci-
cations typically used in the literature which identify foreignness purely on the basis of foreign
ownership. The dependent variable in Table 7 is the maximum inuence rms report over
any of the four arms of government: Executive, Legislature, Ministry and Regulator. Col-
umn 1 of Table 7 shows coecient estimates and standard errors for key variables estimated
from our base regression specication in Equation (1). In the base specication we use the
our 10% foreign-ownership criterion and the multi-national variable to create four mutually
exclusive groups, multinationals operating in their home country, multinationals operating
in a foreign country (i.e. subsidiaries), rms with foreign ownership which do not identify
as part of a multinational, and the excluded category is purely domestic rms. The results
in column 1 are a key contribution of this paper. They show that foreign non-multinational
21Please contact the author for these results.
18rms are no more or less inuential than domestic non-multinationals (referred to here as
purely domestic rms). Similarly foreign multinationals are no more or less inuential than
local multinationals.22 However, both foreign and domestic multinationals are signicantly
more inuential than other types of rms.
Other coecients in Column 1 of Table 7 are also interesting and largely conform to our
prior expectations. Exporters are signicantly more inuential than non-exporters, rms
with government ownership are signicantly more inuential than purely private rms and
size is signicantly related to inuence. Among the sectors, service rms stand out as
signicantly more inuential than similar rms in other sectors. Only age seems to be less
strongly correlated with inuence than we might have expected. We return to this issue in
Table 8 and the discussion thereof. With the exception of Table 8, the coecients on sector,
size and age are generally not reported in the rest of the tables in the body of this paper as
they are not our primary interest.23
Column 2 of Table 7 presents results based on the specication typically used in the
literature. Foreign rms are identied on the basis of ownership and multi-country operations
is excluded. The result in column 2 that foreign-ownership is uncorrelated with inuence echo
the ndings of Chong and Gradstein (2007). Additionally controlling for multinationality,
as in Column 3, does not aect the coecient on foreign-ownership. This is no surprise in
light of our ndings from Column 1.
We noted earlier that rm age is only weakly positively correlated with inuence in Table
7. Intuitively we might expect more established rms to be more inuential. It is often
suggested that rms become more politically embedded with time. On the other hand there
is a large literature - dating back to Caves (1971) - on the obsolescing bargain between foreign
multinationals and host governments. Thus it may be that the weak correlation between
age and inuence may be due to dierent age-inuence trajectories for dierent types of
rms. Table 8 conrms this. Column 1 of Table 8 reports the relevant coecients from
our base specication, note age is only weakly associated with increasing inuence. Column
2 of this table reports coecients where interaction terms between age and \foreignness"
classication have been added.
The results suggest that the inuence of dierent types of rms does indeed evolve dif-
ferently over time. The coecient on the non-interacted `Old' dummy is now positive and
22It is easy to see that there is no statistically signicant dierences between the coecients for MN at
Home and Foreign MN.
23The interested reader may, however, nd the full set of regression results in the Appendix.
19Table 7: Regression of Inuence over Government on Firm Characteristics shows signicant
relationship with multinational aliation but none with foreign ownership. Country dum-
mies, rm sales to capital ratio and number of competitors included but coecients not
reported. Results including cut points are reported in Table 15.
(1) (2) (3)
nc max nc max nc max






Exporter 0.130 0.155 0.136
(0.0361) (0.0354) (0.0360)
Govt. Ownership 0.312 0.328 0.335
(0.0478) (0.0472) (0.0474)
Medium 0.184 0.193 0.185
(0.0356) (0.0354) (0.0356)
Large 0.420 0.449 0.422
(0.0483) (0.0476) (0.0484)
Middle age -0.0140 -0.0184 -0.0158
(0.0383) (0.0382) (0.0382)
Old 0.107 0.103 0.104
(0.0421) (0.0419) (0.0422)
Services 0.174 0.178 0.172
(0.0343) (0.0341) (0.0343)
Other -0.0743 -0.0638 -0.103
(0.171) (0.173) (0.174)
Agriculture -0.00173 -0.00283 -0.00106
(0.0649) (0.0646) (0.0646)






Observations 6096 6089 6051
Standard errors in parentheses
Ordered probit regressions, coecients reported.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
20Table 8: Regression of Inuence over Government on Firm Characteristics including interac-
tions between age and measures of . Results are consistent with an for foreign-owned rms.
Country dummies, government ownership, rm sector, export status, sales to capital ratio
and number of competitors included but coecients not reported.
(1) (2)
nc max nc max
MN at Home 0.159 -0.0431
(0.0529) (0.133)
Foreign MN 0.179 0.304
(0.0564) (0.123)


















MNC Home X Mid-age 0.299
(0.163)
MNC Home X Old 0.194
(0.146)
MNC Foreign X Mid-age -0.0678
(0.155)
MNC Foreign X Old -0.218
(0.141)
Foreign non-MNC X Mid-age -0.136
(0.136)
Foreign non-MNC X Old -0.199
(0.135)
Standard errors in parentheses
Ordered probit regressions, coecients reported.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
21signicant at the 1% level, conrming that older purely domestic rms are indeed more in-
uential than younger ones. Local multinationals also appear to gain inuence with age -
at a somewhat higher rate than other domestic rms. Indeed the negative insignicant sign
on the non-interacted MN Home coecient suggests that local multinationals only become
inuential relative to other domestic rms as they age. In contrast, the large and signicant
coecient on the non-interacted Foreign MN variable conrms that foreign multinationals
are inuential from the time they are established in a new host country. Also in contrast to
domestic rms, it seems that both multinational and non-multinational foreign rms become
somewhat less inuential with age 24. Thus the results in column 2 of Table 8 appear to be
consistent with growing inuence for domestic rms and something of an obsolescing bargain
for foreign rms.
Our base regression includes sector dummies will allow for dierent intercepts, however, it
may be the case that all the coecients vary by sector of operation of the rm as the primary
objectives of the relationship which rms foster with governments varies among the sectors.
For example, utilities in the service sector may be most concerned about competition policy,
while mining companies are concerned about royalties, property rights, and expropriation,
and textile manufacturers about labor and environmental standards. Similarly the relative
importance of dierent rm characteristics to their inuence over government may vary by
sector. For example, a credible threat of relocation to a dierent country is likely to be more
useful to a rm in a tradable sector than a non-tradable one. In light of these potentially
signicant sector-level dierences, Tables 9 and 17 report the regression results by sector.
Table 9 conrms that the importance of the globalization-related variables (multination-
ality, foreign ownership, and exporting) do indeed vary signicantly across sectors. Com-
paring the results in Table 9 to those for the full sample reported in Column 1 of Table 7
we see that some of the conclusions from the full sample were driven by only one or two
sectors. Exporters and local multinationals appear to only be signicantly more inuential
in the services sector. Meanwhile foreign multinationals derive their inuence only from the
manufacturing sector. Foreign non-multinationals remain no more or less inuential than
purely domestic rms, with the exception of agriculture where they appear to be relatively
inuential.
The dierence evident in Table 9 between the sectors in which local and foreign multi-
24The coecients on the foreign MN and non-MN foreign x age interaction terms in column are not
statistically signicant even at the 10% level. However, in regressions not reported here, foreign ownership
and age were interacted. The coecient on this combined interaction term for both types of foreign rms
with the old dummy was negative and signicant at the 5% level.
22Table 9: Firm Characteristics and Inuence on Government by Sector of Firm showing
variation across Sectors in the correlates of inuence. Country dummies, rm size, age, sales
to capital ratio and number of competitors included but coecients not reported. Results
including size, age, and cut points are reported in Table 17.
Manuf. Services Agri. Constr.
MN at Home 0.0209 0.240 -0.315 0.480
(0.0867) (0.0748) (0.666) (0.254)
Foreign MN 0.263 0.140 0.649 0.241
(0.0906) (0.0788) (0.641) (0.306)
Foreign non-MN -0.0654 0.0994 0.821 -0.136
(0.0816) (0.0863) (0.401) (0.315)
Exporter 0.0579 0.222 0.217 -0.0291
(0.0574) (0.0543) (0.215) (0.197)
Govt. Ownership 0.390 0.297 0.313 0.139
(0.0794) (0.0753) (0.187) (0.209)
Observations 2171 2914 462 505
Standard errors in parentheses
Ordered probit regressions, coecients reported.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
nationals are most inuential is worthy of further comment. Firstly it provides additional
evidence to that from Table 8 that the reasons for the inuence of foreign multinationals
might be quite dierent to the explanation of the relative inuence of domestic multination-
als. We might also hypothesize about the source of this inuence if we believe manufacturing
tends to be more tradable than services. In this case the high degree of inuence of foreign
multinationals in the manufacturing sector might be partly attributable to them being the
most `footloose' type of rm. In other words, the credible threat of departure to a competitor
state may be an important source of inuence for foreign multinationals.
Thus far our regressions have pooled the data from the wide variety of countries in
the WBES data. Yet - as discussed in the Introduction - the literature has tended to
treat developed countries separately to developing and transition economies on the topic of
government-rm relations - on the basis that their institutions are fundamentally dierent.
In Tables 10 and 18 we allow for this possibility and nd that there are important dierences
between the OECD and non-OECD subsamples in regard to the coecient on our foreignness
variables.
In Table 10 we see that multinationals do not appear to be more inuential than other
rms in the OECD. Furthermore, foreign non-multinationals appear to be signicantly less
inuential than similar rms. While this result may come as a surprise to people familiar
23Table 10: Regression of Inuence over Government on Firm Characteristics for OECD and
non-OECD Country-groups suggests that OECD countries are less foreign-friendly and less
inuenced by multinationals. Country dummies, rm size, age, sector, sales to capital ratio
and number of competitors included but coecients not reported. Results including size,
age, sector and cut points are reported in Table 18.
All Non-OECD OECD
MN at Home 0.159 0.176 0.00794
(0.0529) (0.0582) (0.141)
Foreign MN 0.179 0.200 0.0334
(0.0564) (0.0629) (0.139)
Foreign non-MN 0.0451 0.0931 -0.485
(0.0566) (0.0601) (0.187)
Exporter 0.130 0.133 0.145
(0.0361) (0.0387) (0.108)
Govt. Ownership 0.312 0.315 0.341
(0.0478) (0.0502) (0.150)
Observations 6096 5374 722
Standard errors in parentheses
Ordered probit regressions, coecients reported.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
with the policy rhetoric and practice in many OECD countries,25 it is readily understandable
in light of the basic economic intuition discussed in Section 3.1. Our fundamental intuition
was that the inuence a rm has over the government is increasing in the benets which
the operation of the rm produces both directly for the government and for the national
economy more broadly, and also increasing in the credibility of the rm's threat to relocate
its operations elsewhere. It is not dicult to argue that OECD countries are generally
less desperate for foreign capital to boost their investment rates and also less in need of the
advanced management skills and technology that often accompanies foreign direct investment
(particularly when it comes in the form of a multinational subsidiary). Furthermore, foreign
direct investment into OECD countries is dominantly market-seeking or horizontal. Market-
seeking foreign rms have a much less credible relocation threat than resource-seeking or
vertical forms of foreign investment. Thus we believe that our nding of relatively low
inuence for both foreign-owned and multinational rms in OECD countries supports our
intuition about the determinants of rms' inuence over governments.
25For example, while OECD countries are keen to emphasize the need for binding investor protections in
via international investment treaties in their dealings with non-OECD countries, they almost never enter
such treaties with another OECD country. Of the many thousands of investment treaties in existence, we
are not aware of a single one which includes investor-state arbitration clauses but does not involve at least
one non-OECD country.
245. Checks on the Robustness of the Findings
As described in Section 3, we undertook numerous robustness checks based partly on the
work of previous authors using the same or similar data. The majority of these checks did
not result in any new insights or implications for our ndings. In the current section we
report only the results of the two checks which did produce some insight.
Table 11 reports results for the base regression applied to subsamples by size classication.
The purpose of this table is both to check whether our \foreignness" variables are somehow
picking-up unexplained heterogeneity between size classes, and to see whether our ndings
hold within all size categories. Table 11 shows that, as we might expect, all our explanatory
variables matter more within the group of small rms. 26 In particular, exporting appears to
only explain dierences among small rms. The magnitude of the coecients on the foreign
and local multinational variables are fairly robust across the groups and it would appear
that the loss of statistical signicance is largely due to smaller sample size compared to the
pooled regression.
Table 11: Firm Characteristics and Inuence on Government by Size Category of Firm
shows results are qualitatively consistent across size categories. Country dummies, rm
age, sector, sales to capital ratio and number of competitors included but coecients not
reported. Results including sector and cut points are reported in Table 19.
All Small Medium Large
MN at Home 0.159 0.203 0.134 0.164
(0.0529) (0.109) (0.0829) (0.0985)
Foreign MN 0.179 0.359 0.105 0.203
(0.0564) (0.155) (0.0828) (0.101)
Foreign non-MN 0.0451 0.144 0.0209 0.0443
(0.0566) (0.124) (0.0824) (0.112)
Exporter 0.130 0.236 0.0716 0.0778
(0.0361) (0.0651) (0.0541) (0.0888)
Govt. Ownership 0.312 0.425 0.227 0.367
(0.0478) (0.144) (0.0647) (0.107)
Observations 6096 2448 2651 997
Standard errors in parentheses
Ordered probit regressions, coecients reported.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 12 reports regression results where the dependent variable in each column is the
26Somewhat surprisingly, however, there is weak evidence that our control variables are better at explaining
inuence patterns among large rms than among medium-sized ones.
25reported inuence over each of the four branches of government: Executive, Legislature,
Ministry and Regulator. Our central ndings are robust across the branches of government,
with the exception that the statistical signicance of the inuence of foreign multinationals
does not extend to the legislature. There is also weak evidence that this relative lack of
inuence applies to non-multinational foreign rms and to both executive and legislature.
One way of viewing such a result would be that foreign rms are relatively less inuential
over the more directly elected branches of government.
Table 12: Firm Characteristics and Inuence on Dierent Branches of Government. Country
dummies, rm size, age, sector, sales to capital ratio and number of competitors included
but coecients not reported. Results including size, age, sector, and cut points are reported
in Table 16.
Executive Legislator Ministry Regulator
MN at Home 0.186 0.204 0.187 0.151
(0.0548) (0.0539) (0.0540) (0.0558)
Foreign MN 0.123 0.0944 0.170 0.152
(0.0574) (0.0592) (0.0568) (0.0557)
Foreign non-MN -0.0156 -0.0471 0.0374 0.0856
(0.0595) (0.0578) (0.0601) (0.0570)
Exporter 0.0944 0.114 0.139 0.115
(0.0366) (0.0370) (0.0370) (0.0373)
Govt. Ownership 0.293 0.265 0.345 0.206
(0.0496) (0.0501) (0.0499) (0.0503)
Observations 6074 6071 6047 6050
Standard errors in parentheses
Ordered probit regressions, coecients reported.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
6. Conclusion
Concern that multinational rms have disproportionate inuence over government decisions,
particularly in developing countries, is a central feature of the critique of `corporate' glob-
alization. At the same time there have been signicant developments in international law
in recent decades protecting foreign direct investments from supposedly discriminatory and
expropriatory actions of host governments - particularly in developing countries. This pa-
per used data on managers' perceptions of their rm's inuence over government from the
World Business Environment Survey (WBES) to examine whether either of these apparently
contradictory world-views has empirical support.
26A particularly important feature of the WBES for our purposes is that in addition to a
question on the extent of foreign ownership, it includes a question on whether the rm has
operations or holdings in other countries. Thus, unlike most empirical work on foreign direct
investment, we were able to dierentiate between rms which merely had substantive foreign
ownership and rms which identied themselves as part of a multinational. This distinction
was important, with only about half the foreign-owned rms associating themselves with
a multinational. The characteristics of non-multinational foreign rms diered from those
of multinational foreign rms in systematic ways which supported our hypothesis that they
were the recipients of substantial amounts of portfolio investment. The signicant numbers
of rms in this group suggest they are worthy of more research attention than they have
received to date.
The distinction between multinational and non-multinational foreign rms was important
to understanding the relationship with host governments. On average across our sample of
countries multinational (both foreign and domestic) were signicantly more inuential than
non-multinationals. Foreign ownership, alone, was not correlated with inuence: foreign
multinationals were as inuential as domestic multinationals and foreign non-multinationals
were as inuential as purely domestic rms.
In view of the distinct strands of literature addressing the relationship between foreign
rms and host governments in developed and developing countries, we also ran separate re-
gressions for OECD and non-OECD subsamples. The results for the non-OECD subsample
were consistent with the whole sample results. The OECD sample, however, showed impor-
tant dierences. In the OECD sample neither foreign nor domestic multinationals were more
inuential than purely domestic rms, but foreign non-multinationals did report signicantly
less inuence.
Our theoretical understanding of the determinants of inuence in both OECD and non-
OECD countries is that they are consistent with a government-rm bargaining model in
which a rm's inuence is increasing in the benets the government expects from the rm's
operation in the economy. However, we have not attempted to formally test any theory
and note that the results for the OECD are also likely to be consistent with theories on the
`liability of foreignness'.
Taken together our results suggest that anti-foreign bias is - if anything - a rich country
phenomena, while multinational `dominance' might be based on developing country expe-
riences. For governments of non-OECD countries the benets of foreign capital appear to
27outweigh potential sources of disenfranchisement for foreign rms and there appears lit-
tle justication for an emphasis on protecting foreign investments in developing countries,
particularly in regard to investments by foreign multinationals.
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Transition Europe Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep, Estonia, Geor-
gia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgizstan, Lithua-
nia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
East Asia China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore
South Asia India
Latin America Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mex-
ico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago,
Uruguay, Venezuela
OECD Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States
Table 13: Countries with data included in the base regression by WB Region
Variable Mean
Domestic MN at Home Foreign MN Foreign nonMN All
Govt. Ownership 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.13
Exporter 0.24 0.63 0.62 0.55 0.33
Medium 0.41 0.44 0.39 0.51 0.42
Large 0.11 0.34 0.45 0.27 0.17
Middle-aged 0.34 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.33
Old 0.33 0.57 0.47 0.37 0.36
Manufacturing 0.34 0.45 0.49 0.54 0.38
Services 0.48 0.43 0.46 0.37 0.46
Table 14: Summary of Firm Characteristics by foreign/MNC classication
Table 15: Firm Characteristics and Inuence on Gov-
ernment. Country dummies, sales to capital ratio and
number of competitors category included but coecients
not reported.
(1) (2) (3)
nc max nc max nc max






Exporter 0.130 0.155 0.136
(0.0361) (0.0354) (0.0360)
Govt. Ownership 0.312 0.328 0.335
(0.0478) (0.0472) (0.0474)
Medium 0.184 0.193 0.185
(0.0356) (0.0354) (0.0356)
Large 0.420 0.449 0.422
(0.0483) (0.0476) (0.0484)
Middle age -0.0140 -0.0184 -0.0158
(0.0383) (0.0382) (0.0382)
Old 0.107 0.103 0.104
(0.0421) (0.0419) (0.0422)
Services 0.174 0.178 0.172
(0.0343) (0.0341) (0.0343)
Other -0.0743 -0.0638 -0.103
(0.171) (0.173) (0.174)
Agriculture -0.00173 -0.00283 -0.00106
(0.0649) (0.0646) (0.0646)






cut1 -2.324 -1.918 -1.905
(0.193) (0.107) (0.106)
cut2 -0.631 -0.226 -0.216
(0.192) (0.106) (0.106)
cut3 -0.00579 0.395 0.405
(0.192) (0.106) (0.106)
cut4 0.600 0.998 1.008
(0.193) (0.107) (0.107)
cut5 1.137 1.533 1.544
(0.193) (0.108) (0.108)
Observations 6096 6089 6051
Standard errors in parentheses
Ordered probit regressions, coecients reported.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
32Table 16: Interacted Firm Characteristics and Maxi-
mum Inuence on Government. Country dummies, sales
to capital ratio and number of competitors category in-
cluded but coecients not reported.
Executive Legislator Ministry Regulator
MN at Home 0.186 0.204 0.187 0.151
(0.0548) (0.0539) (0.0540) (0.0558)
Foreign MN 0.123 0.0944 0.170 0.152
(0.0574) (0.0592) (0.0568) (0.0557)
Foreign non-MN -0.0156 -0.0471 0.0374 0.0856
(0.0595) (0.0578) (0.0601) (0.0570)
Exporter 0.0944 0.114 0.139 0.115
(0.0366) (0.0370) (0.0370) (0.0373)
Govt. Ownership 0.293 0.265 0.345 0.206
(0.0496) (0.0501) (0.0499) (0.0503)
Medium 0.157 0.132 0.162 0.170
(0.0361) (0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0356)
Large 0.405 0.379 0.424 0.363
(0.0497) (0.0497) (0.0499) (0.0497)
Middle age -0.0533 -0.0384 -0.0267 -0.0836
(0.0391) (0.0393) (0.0391) (0.0388)
Old 0.0548 0.0679 0.0801 0.0825
(0.0426) (0.0431) (0.0430) (0.0433)
Services 0.131 0.108 0.145 0.178
(0.0353) (0.0351) (0.0352) (0.0352)
Other -0.210 -0.0707 -0.119 0.00740
(0.195) (0.202) (0.199) (0.192)
Agriculture -0.00705 -0.0440 -0.0354 -0.0115
(0.0661) (0.0664) (0.0675) (0.0663)
Construction 0.0584 0.0206 0.0670 0.150
(0.0564) (0.0575) (0.0578) (0.0572)
cut1 -1.866 -2.018 -1.856 -2.136
(0.115) (0.105) (0.135) (0.213)
cut2 0.0310 -0.0759 0.0808 -0.310
(0.114) (0.103) (0.134) (0.212)
cut3 0.743 0.635 0.762 0.358
(0.114) (0.104) (0.135) (0.212)
cut4 1.286 1.163 1.324 0.957
(0.116) (0.104) (0.136) (0.213)
cut5 1.813 1.668 1.863 1.516
(0.116) (0.106) (0.138) (0.213)
Observations 6074 6071 6047 6050
Standard errors in parentheses
33Ordered probit regressions, coecients reported.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 17: Firm Characteristics and Inuence on Govern-
ment by Sector of Firm. Country dummies, sales to cap-
ital ratio and number of competitors category included
but coecients not reported.
Manuf. Services Agri. Constr.
MN at Home 0.0209 0.240 -0.315 0.480
(0.0867) (0.0748) (0.666) (0.254)
Foreign MN 0.263 0.140 0.649 0.241
(0.0906) (0.0788) (0.641) (0.306)
Foreign non-MN -0.0654 0.0994 0.821 -0.136
(0.0816) (0.0863) (0.401) (0.315)
Exporter 0.0579 0.222 0.217 -0.0291
(0.0574) (0.0543) (0.215) (0.197)
Govt. Ownership 0.390 0.297 0.313 0.139
(0.0794) (0.0753) (0.187) (0.209)
Medium 0.213 0.138 0.334 0.0856
(0.0642) (0.0509) (0.178) (0.130)
Large 0.431 0.441 0.365 0.349
(0.0816) (0.0710) (0.256) (0.232)
Middle age 0.0302 -0.00167 -0.0228 0.0270
(0.0707) (0.0542) (0.150) (0.138)
Old 0.172 0.148 -0.284 0.419
(0.0735) (0.0627) (0.211) (0.157)
cut1 -2.329 -2.412 -0.127 -4.031
(0.449) (0.216) (0.591) (0.510)
cut2 -0.554 -0.723 1.500 -2.108
(0.447) (0.214) (0.597) (0.491)
cut3 0.141 -0.0891 1.983 -1.512
(0.448) (0.214) (0.602) (0.486)
cut4 0.789 0.500 2.710 -0.845
(0.449) (0.216) (0.593) (0.492)
cut5 1.292 1.076 3.334 -0.281
(0.450) (0.214) (0.615) (0.501)
Observations 2171 2914 462 505
Standard errors in parentheses
Ordered probit regressions, coecients reported.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
34Table 18: Regression of Inuence over Government on
Firm Characteristics for OECD and non-OECD Country-
groups. Country dummies, sales to capital ratio and
number of competitors category included but coecients
not reported.
All Non-OECD OECD
MN at Home 0.159 0.176 0.00794
(0.0529) (0.0582) (0.141)
Foreign MN 0.179 0.200 0.0334
(0.0564) (0.0629) (0.139)
Foreign non-MN 0.0451 0.0931 -0.485
(0.0566) (0.0601) (0.187)
Exporter 0.130 0.133 0.145
(0.0361) (0.0387) (0.108)
Govt. Ownership 0.312 0.315 0.341
(0.0478) (0.0502) (0.150)
Medium 0.184 0.169 0.359
(0.0356) (0.0380) (0.114)
Large 0.420 0.385 0.775
(0.0483) (0.0518) (0.147)
Middle age -0.0140 -0.00226 -0.206
(0.0383) (0.0394) (0.148)
Old 0.107 0.0973 0.0978
(0.0421) (0.0451) (0.139)




Agriculture -0.00173 0.00378 -0.245
(0.0649) (0.0645) (0.443)
Construction 0.0976 0.0723 0.347
(0.0560) (0.0597) (0.178)
cut1 -2.324 -2.365 -0.728
(0.193) (0.205) (0.290)
cut2 -0.631 -0.731 0.0950
(0.192) (0.204) (0.290)
cut3 -0.00579 -0.132 0.657
(0.192) (0.204) (0.294)




Observations 6096 5374 722
35Standard errors in parentheses
Ordered probit regressions, coecients reported.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 19: Firm Characteristics and Inuence on Govern-
ment by Size Category of Firm. Country dummies, sales
to capital ratio and number of competitors category in-
cluded but coecients not reported.
All Small Medium Large
MN at Home 0.159 0.203 0.134 0.164
(0.0529) (0.109) (0.0829) (0.0985)
Foreign MN 0.179 0.359 0.105 0.203
(0.0564) (0.155) (0.0828) (0.101)
Foreign non-MN 0.0451 0.144 0.0209 0.0443
(0.0566) (0.124) (0.0824) (0.112)
Exporter 0.130 0.236 0.0716 0.0778
(0.0361) (0.0651) (0.0541) (0.0888)
Govt. Ownership 0.312 0.425 0.227 0.367





Middle age -0.0140 -0.0365 0.00818 -0.0421
(0.0383) (0.0567) (0.0605) (0.133)
Old 0.107 0.139 0.0878 0.121
(0.0421) (0.0726) (0.0621) (0.123)
Services 0.174 0.202 0.114 0.357
(0.0343) (0.0585) (0.0511) (0.0925)
Other -0.0743 -0.108 -0.0209
(0.171) (0.224) (0.283)
Agriculture -0.00173 -0.0450 0.0383 -0.0718
(0.0649) (0.133) (0.0861) (0.173)
Construction 0.0976 0.149 0.0200 0.160
(0.0560) (0.0873) (0.0855) (0.167)
cut1 -2.324 -2.359 -2.820 -2.439
(0.193) (0.312) (0.323) (0.330)
cut2 -0.631 -0.515 -1.179 -0.842
(0.192) (0.309) (0.322) (0.325)
cut3 -0.00579 0.0715 -0.565 -0.0486
(0.192) (0.310) (0.322) (0.326)
cut4 0.600 0.556 0.0675 0.717
36(0.193) (0.311) (0.322) (0.327)
cut5 1.137 1.117 0.579 1.310
(0.193) (0.312) (0.321) (0.327)
Observations 6096 2448 2651 997
Standard errors in parentheses
Ordered probit regressions, coecients reported.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 20: Firm Characteristics and Dierent Measures
of Inuence on Government. Country dummies, sales
to capital ratio and number of competitors category in-
cluded but coecients not reported.
Firm Inuence Predictable Law Changes Firm and Business Org. Voice
MN at Home 0.159 0.00182 0.117
(0.0529) (0.0496) (0.0517)
Foreign MN 0.179 -0.0527 0.0850
(0.0564) (0.0519) (0.0538)
Foreign non-MN 0.0451 -0.0727 0.0780
(0.0566) (0.0468) (0.0513)
Exporter 0.130 -0.0679 0.0974
(0.0361) (0.0326) (0.0334)
Govt. Ownership 0.312 -0.174 0.298
(0.0478) (0.0447) (0.0463)
Medium 0.184 -0.123 0.167
(0.0356) (0.0324) (0.0341)
Large 0.420 -0.190 0.348
(0.0483) (0.0444) (0.0458)
Middle age -0.0140 -0.0291 0.0927
(0.0383) (0.0341) (0.0364)
Old 0.107 -0.0874 0.178
(0.0421) (0.0393) (0.0409)
Services 0.174 -0.105 0.0918
(0.0343) (0.0318) (0.0325)
Other -0.0743 -0.273 0.247
(0.171) (0.168) (0.171)
Agriculture -0.00173 0.0124 0.0299
(0.0649) (0.0605) (0.0616)
Construction 0.0976 -0.167 -0.0317
(0.0560) (0.0518) (0.0537)
cut1 -2.324 -1.638 -0.672
(0.193) (0.179) (0.218)
cut2 -0.631 -0.946 0.0744
37(0.192) (0.178) (0.218)
cut3 -0.00579 0.184 0.896
(0.192) (0.177) (0.218)
cut4 0.600 1.035 1.458
(0.193) (0.178) (0.219)
cut5 1.137 1.612 2.156
(0.193) (0.178) (0.219)
Observations 6096 6780 6681
Standard errors in parentheses
Ordered probit regressions, coecients reported.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
38